Anatomy of a campaign : the British fiasco in Norway, 1940 / John Kiszely.
By: Kiszely, John [author.]
.Series: Cambridge military histories.Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017Description: xv, 375 pages : illustrations (black and white), maps (black and white).Content type: text | still image | cartographic image Media type: unmediated Carrier type: volumeISBN: 9781107194595.Subject(s): World War, 1939-1945 -- Campaigns -- Norway | World War, 1939-1945 -- Naval operations, British | Norway -- Strategic aspects | Norway -- History -- German occupation, 1940-1945DDC classification: 940.542181 | Item type | Current library | Class number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Book | House of Lords Library - Palace Dewey | 940.542181 KIS (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 015223 |
First published 2017, third printing 2018.
1. Introduction -- 2. 'A legitimate shadow' -- 3. Deciding to decide -- 4. Warning signs -- 5. 'The major project' -- 6. 'Hare-brained' -- 7. Taking stock -- 8. Weserübung -- 9. 'Something must be done' -- 10. The jigsaw puzzle -- 11. 'Something must be done' -- 12. 'Boldness is required' -- 13. 'An even greater prize' -- 14. Maurice -- 15. Sickle -- 16. 'We must get out' -- 17. The third dimension -- 18. 'In the name of God, go!' -- 19. 'A good dividend' -- 20. 'No time to lose' -- 21. The long retreat -- 22. Finale -- 23. Conclusions.
"The British campaign in Norway in 1940 was an ignominious and abject failure. It is perhaps best known as the fiasco which directly led to the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Winston Churchill. But what were the reasons for failure? Why did the decision makers, including Churchill, make such poor decisions and exercise such bad judgement? What other factors played a part? John Kiszely draws on his own experience of working at all levels in the military to assess the campaign as a whole, its context and evolution from strategic failures, intelligence blunders and German air superiority to the performance of the troops and the serious errors of judgement by those responsible for the higher direction of the war. The result helps us to understand not only the outcome of the Norwegian campaign but also why more recent military campaigns have found success so elusive." Taken from dust jacket.