Planning to fail : the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan / James H. Lebovic.
Series: Bridging the gap: ; Oxford scholarship online: Publisher: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019Description: 1 online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780190937263 (ebook) :.Subject(s): United States -- Military policy -- Decision making -- Case studies | National security -- United States -- Decision making -- Case studies | Vietnam War, 1961-1975 | Iraq War, 2003-2011 | Afghan War, 2001- | United States -- History, Military -- Case studiesAdditional Physical Form: Print version : 9780190935320DDC classification: 355.020973 Online resources: Oxford scholarship online Summary: The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices.| Item type | Current library | Class number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ebook | House of Lords Library - Palace Online access | 1 | Available |
Previously issued in print: 2019.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices.
Specialized.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on March 14, 2019).