TY  - BOOK
AU  - Lebovic,James H.
TI  - Planning to fail: the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
T2  - Bridging the gap
SN  - 9780190937263 (ebook) :
AV  - UA23 .L4477 2019
U1  - 355.020973 23
PY  - 2019///
CY  - New York, NY
PB  - Oxford University Press
KW  - National security
KW  - United States
KW  - Decision making
KW  - Case studies
KW  - Afghan War, 2001-
KW  - Military policy
KW  - Vietnam War, 1961-1975
KW  - Iraq War, 2003-2011
KW  - History, Military
N1  - Previously issued in print: 2019; Includes bibliographical references and index; Specialized
N2  - The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices
UR  - https://go.openathens.net/redirector/lords.parliament.uk?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190935320.001.0001
ER  -