Raise the debt : how developing countries choose their creditors / Jonas B. Bunte.
Series: Oxford scholarship online: Publisher: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019Description: 1 online resource : illustrations (black and white).Content type: text | still image Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780190909581 (ebook) :.Subject(s): Debts, Public -- Developing countries
| Debts, External -- Developing countriesAdditional Physical Form: Print version : 9780190866167DDC classification: 336.3435091724 Online resources: Oxford scholarship online Summary: Why do some governments borrow from China, while others borrow from the United States or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? This work systematically explains how governments choose among competing loan offers. As the strings attached to loans vary across creditors, domestic interest groups prefer one type of creditor to the other. However, interest groups disagree about which creditor is preferable. Governments cater to whichever domestic interest group coalition is dominant by borrowing from the coalition's preferred creditor. The text offers evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia as well as an extensive statistical analysis. The results show that borrowing portfolios around the world reflect the relative strength of societal interest groups.
| Item type | Current library | Class number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ebook | House of Lords Library - Palace Online access | 1 | Available |
Previously issued in print: 2019.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Why do some governments borrow from China, while others borrow from the United States or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? This work systematically explains how governments choose among competing loan offers. As the strings attached to loans vary across creditors, domestic interest groups prefer one type of creditor to the other. However, interest groups disagree about which creditor is preferable. Governments cater to whichever domestic interest group coalition is dominant by borrowing from the coalition's preferred creditor. The text offers evidence from Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia as well as an extensive statistical analysis. The results show that borrowing portfolios around the world reflect the relative strength of societal interest groups.
Specialized.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on January 23, 2019).