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Hard target : sanctions, inducements, and the case of North Korea / Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland.

By: Haggard, Stephan [author.].Contributor(s): Noland, Marcus, 1959- [author.].Series: Studies in Asian security: Publisher: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2017Description: xiii, 321 pages : illustrations.Content type: text Media type: unmediated Carrier type: volumeISBN: 9781503600362 ; 9781503601994.Subject(s): Economic sanctions -- Korea (North) | Nuclear disarmament -- Korea (North) | Korea (North) -- Foreign economic relations | Korea (North) -- Foreign relationsAdditional Physical Form: Online version:Haggard, Stephan, author. 9781503601994Haggard, Stephan, author.DDC classification: 327.117095193
Contents:
1. Introduction: the political economy of engagement -- 2. The political economy of North Korea: the paradigmatic hard target -- 3. North Korea's external economic relations, 1990–2016 -- 4. Humanitarian dilemmas: the political economy of food -- 5. The microeconomics of engagement -- 6. Negotiating on nuclear weapons I: the rise and fall of the Six Party Talks (2001-2008) -- 7. Negotiating on nuclear weapons II: permanent crisis, 2009-2016 -- 8. Conclusion: whither North Korea? Whither economic statecraft?
Summary: "Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune—and even hostile—to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the country's nuclear program. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland draw on an array of evidence to show the reluctance of the North Korean leadership to weaken its grip on foreign economic activity. They argue that inducements have limited effect on the regime, and instead urge policymakers to think in terms of gradual strategies. Hard Target connects economic statecraft to the marketization process to understand North Korea and addresses a larger debate over the merits and demerits of "engagement" with adversaries." -- Taken from back cover.
Holdings
Item type Current library Class number Status Date due Barcode
Book House of Lords Library - Palace Dewey 327.117095193 HAG (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 015754

1. Introduction: the political economy of engagement -- 2. The political economy of North Korea: the paradigmatic hard target -- 3. North Korea's external economic relations, 1990–2016 -- 4. Humanitarian dilemmas: the political economy of food -- 5. The microeconomics of engagement -- 6. Negotiating on nuclear weapons I: the rise and fall of the Six Party Talks (2001-2008) -- 7. Negotiating on nuclear weapons II: permanent crisis, 2009-2016 -- 8. Conclusion: whither North Korea? Whither economic statecraft?

"Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune—and even hostile—to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the country's nuclear program.

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland draw on an array of evidence to show the reluctance of the North Korean leadership to weaken its grip on foreign economic activity. They argue that inducements have limited effect on the regime, and instead urge policymakers to think in terms of gradual strategies. Hard Target connects economic statecraft to the marketization process to understand North Korea and addresses a larger debate over the merits and demerits of "engagement" with adversaries." -- Taken from back cover.

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