000			02036cam a2200289Ii 4500
001			u80334
005			20171208181009.0
007			ta
008			171116s2017 enk b 001 0 eng d
020			_a9781107170773 _qhardback
020			_a110717077X _qhardback
020			_a9781316621806 _qpaperback
020			_a1316621804 _qpaperback
040			_aYDX _beng _erda _cYDX _dINU _dOCLCF _dUNL _dUK-LoPHL
082	0	4	_a355.0218
100	1		_aLadwig, Walter C. _q(Walter Carl), _d1976- _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe forgotten front : _bpatron-client relationships in counterinsurgency / _cWalter C. Ladwig.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2017.
300			_axv, 346 pages
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier
520			_a"After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments' counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies--the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War--Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client's behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity."-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aCounterinsurgency. _936814
651		0	_aUnited States _xForeign relations. _919478
942			_n0
999			_c72030 _d72030